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The class of dispositional expressions is varied, and its extension is debated and 
potentially very broad. Goodman (1954: 3) says that it ‘includes not only predicates 
ending in “ible” and “able” but almost every objective predicate, such as “is red”.’ We 
may distinguish covertly dispositional expressions: ‘soluble’ and ‘fragile’ for example, 
and overtly dispositional expressions: ‘disposed to dissolved when immersed in water’, 
‘disposed to break when struck’. What makes these dispositional is, roughly speaking, 
that they indicate that the objects of which they are predicated would behave in 
certain ways (their manifestations) in certain circumstances (their stimuli).  
Dispositional expressions are one kind of thing. Dispositions are another. The 
former is a subclass of predicates. The latter is a subclass of properties. The 
connection between the two is not at all straightforward. For dispositional and non-
dispositional expressions may co-refer (‘avarice’ and ‘the property most conspicuously 
displayed by Molière’s Harpagon’). And while the class of dispositional predicates is 
neither empty nor exhaustive, it is a matter of debate whether any or all properties are 
truly dispositional in nature. Paradigm dispositional expressions (e.g. ‘soluble’) indicate 
the definite occurrence of a manifestation in suitable circumstances; the corresponding 
properties are ‘sure-fire’ dispositions. In addition to these are terms (such as ‘irascible’) 
that indicate some degree of liability for the manifestation to occur in suitable 
circumstances. Correspondingly, in addition to sure-fire dispositions there is a class of 
disposition-like properties that includes capacities, tendencies, and propensities.  
While there has been a continuous tradition of generating and refining analyses of 
dispositions since the 1930s, the function and nature of such analyses have not be 
constant. Initially philosophers focussed on analyzing dispositional expressions or 
concepts (linguistic or mental items), but more recent philosophical concern purports 
to be more with the properties themselves (features of the world). At the same time the 
motivation for attempts at analysis has shifted. The tradition starts with Carnap’s 
attempt to reconcile the role of dispositional terms in science with his verificationism. 
In the middle part of the twentieth century, interest in dispositions centered on Ryle’s 
dispositional view of the mind and then later on the functionalist theory of mental 
states. More recently, fundamental natural properties have been held to be 
dispositional in nature and the analysis of dispositions is invoked in accounting for the 
laws of nature. This eighty-year history of the analysis of dispositions reveals changing 
conceptions of the function of philosophical analysis and its relationship to the 
philosophy of language.  
 
2 CARNAP ON TESTABILITY AND DISPOSITION CONCEPTS 
 
Carnap’s interest in dispositional expressions stems from a dilemma presented by his 
commitment to a certain brand of empiricism. That empiricism gives a special place 
to science. Science is the paradigm of what can be known and what can be said. 
Indeed the logical positivists sometimes suggest that science is coextensive with the 
extent of possible knowledge. According to Ayer (1936) ‘There is no field of 
experience which cannot, in principle, be brought under some form of scientific law, 
and no type of speculative knowledge about the world which it is, in principle, beyond 
the power of science to give.’ Given this emphasis on the primacy of science, it is 
important for the positivists to accommodate rather than reject the statements of 
science—which stands in contrast to their attitude towards the statements of 
metaphysics. And dispositional expressions play an important role in the statements of 
science. Carnap’s principal example is the predicate ‘soluble’, but many central terms 
in science may be considered dispositional also (although particular cases may be 
disputed). ‘Fitness’ in evolutionary biology concerns an organism’s disposition to 
survive and breed (Mills and Beatty 1979); ‘electric charge’ denotes a body’s 
disposition to exert a force on another charged body (Broad 1933: 267); and so forth. 
Thus the commitment to science implies to a commitment to provide a satisfactory 
philosophical account of such predicates.  
This empiricism also seemed to the positivists to provide a particular role for 
philosophical analysis. For the all-encompassing role of science also, it appeared to 
them, demands that philosophy should not be regarded as making contentful 
statements about the world. If philosophers claim to be so doing, then their efforts 
would fail and should be excluded from philosophy. Hence the rejection of 
metaphysics. The propositions of philosophy, says Ayer (1936: 76), ‘are not factual but 
linguistic in character . . . they express definitions, or the formal consequences of 
definitions.’ Such a view requires a demarcation principle, to differentiate those 
statements that are factual (the statements of science) from those that purport to be 
factual but which are not (the statements of metaphysics). Furthermore, since 
philosophy is in the business of supplying definitions, it invites us to supply principles 
that constrain what counts as an acceptable definition. As is well known both tasks are 
achieved by the verification principle, which Carnap (1936: 420) expresses thus, ‘the 
meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical with the way we determine its 
truth or falsehood; and a sentence has meaning only if such a determination is 
possible.’ Like Ayer, Carnap (1935) emphasizes that philosophy is primarily 
concerned with language, ‘The function of logical analysis is to analyze all knowledge, 
all assertions of science and of everyday life, in order to make clear the sense of each 
such assertion and the connections between them. One of the principal tasks of the 
logical analysis of a given proposition is to find out the method of verification for that 
proposition.’  
So logical empiricism demands that the role of philosophy is to analyze the 
propositions of science in terms of their method of verification, and in the light of the 
central role they play in science, it requires that we provide such an analysis of 
sentences containing dispositional predicates in particular. However, if we take the 
method of verification to require direct observation, then a problem arises, for the 
satisfaction of dispositional predicates is not always directly observable. That a 
particular crystal is soluble is not directly observable, so long as it is not placed in 
water. A sample of barium sulphate and a sample of sodium chloride may look just 
the same. If neither is immersed in water, then there is no apparent difference 
between the solubility of the former and in the insolubility of the latter. Likewise a 
charged particle and a neutral particle will behave the same so long as there is no 
electric or magnetic field. Since an important scientific difference is not always directly 
verifiable, we have a prima facie challenge to verificationism.  
While the immediate context of Carnap’s article ‘Testability and meaning’ is the 
analysis of a key class of scientific predicates, logical empiricists also had a broader 
concern with dispositions. Phenomenalism has always been attractive to empiricists as 
a way of maintaining the exclusive epistemological role of experience without 
succumbing to scepticism. But since a simple reduction to actual experiences leads to 
well-known problems, unless one resorts to Berkeley’s theological solution, it is natural 
to consider reduction to possible experiences, as in Mill’s ‘permanent possibilities of 
sensation’ or later Mach’s ‘functional relations of elements’ (where elements are, more 
or less, the same as sensations). It is natural to interpret Mach’s relations as 
dispositions. Mach himself intended ‘function’ to have its mathematical sense. But 
then, Schlick (1918: 212–14) complains, we would be reducing a material thing to 
‘something quite shadowy’, and furthermore something that is a relation between 
things that do not exist (the possible but non-actual sensations).  
So, in order to satisfy the verificationist demand that meaningful statements should 
be verifiable, the testing that will verify or confirm the presence or otherwise of a 
disposition needs to be more than direct observation. It might be tempting to think 
that ‘solubility’ and ‘charge’ name unobservable properties of things that cause their 
behaviour in water or in electro-magnetic fields.  But this is precisely the kind of 
metaphysics that positivism rejects.  Instead we should understand these expressions in 
terms of the kind of observable test that would confirm their correct application. 
Clearly an appropriate test of the difference between a soluble item and an insoluble 
item is to observe their dissolving or not dissolving when the items are placed in water. So, 
according to Carnap (1936), a natural first pass at a definition of ‘x is soluble’ is 
‘whenever x is placed in water, x dissolves’.  
The use of ‘whenever’ is a mistake, for as Mellor (1974: 106) notes, this makes 
solubility an immutable property. It may be that in using ‘whenever’ Carnap was 
influenced by a sense of the modal nature of disposition ascriptions, to which we shall 
come later. Be that as it may, whether an object is soluble now should not depend on 
how it is at previous or later times, for things can gain and lose dispositions. If we 
ignore this error, we can express Carnap’s view thus:  
(D) Sx   iff   (Wx → Dx)  
where ‘Sx’ symbolizes ‘x is soluble’; ‘Wx’ is ‘x is placed in water; ‘Dx’ is ‘x dissolves. Wx 
is the test condition (later stimulus condition) and Dx is the response condition (also 
manifestation condition).  
The objection to (D) that Carnap immediately raises concerns an item that is never 
in its history placed in water, for example a match which is never placed in water and 
then is burned up. We see that the right hand side of (D) is satisfied trivially. Thus the 
match counts as soluble even though it clearly is not.  
Carnap then considers the ‘bilateral reduction sentence’:  
(R) Wx → (Sx ↔ Dx).  
(R) provides a test both for the presence of and for the absence of solubility, and to 
that degree satisfies the requirements of the verification principle concerning meaning. 
On the other hand, as Carnap recognizes, (R) does not say anything about the 
solubility or otherwise of some item that is not in water. And so (R) does not provide 
any way of eliminating talk of solubility.  
These points against (R) were also made by Storer (1951). Storer’s response was to 
note that a soluble item not in water is like, in other respects, items that are in water 
and dissolving and is unlike, in that respect, items that are insoluble. So to say that 
something is soluble is to say:  
either it is in water and dissolves; or it has some property B, such that B is 
possessed by some other item that is in water and does dissolve and B is not 
possessed by any item that is in water and does not dissolve.  
Storer’s proposal is notable in that it is the first to introduce a component that 
would later become to be thought of as the causal basis of the disposition. This is 
moving away from Carnap’s concern with verifiability, to the extent that the 
possession of the causal basis is not itself something that is guaranteed to be verifiable. 
For example, the sort of property that Storer had in mind would be ‘being sugar’. 
Being sugar is not a directly verifiable property, and might be held to be one that is 
verified by the identification of its characteristic dispositions. Furthermore, without 
restricting the quantification over properties (e.g. to natural properties) there are 
substitutions for B that make any object soluble (e.g. the property of being identical 
either to this stone [insoluble, not in water] or to that sugar cube [in water and 
dissolving], which is a property possessed by the stone). 
More immediately problematic is the fact that we can imagine that an object might 
have a disposition yet be the only thing of its kind to have that disposition. If it does 
not undergo the relevant test procedure (e.g. being placed in water) then Storer’s 
analysis will deny that the object has the disposition. For example, we might imagine 
that industrial chemists devise an entirely new material that is soluble. The basis of its 
solubility is a novel feature of this material, and so no other substance dissolves in 
virtue of possessing this property. If the chemists only ever make one sample of this 
material which they burn in due course, without ever placing in water, then this 
material will not count as soluble. On the other hand, had the chemists made a 
second, identical sample, which they did place in water (and so which does dissolve), 
the first sample would count soluble. In short, the objection is that whether or not an 
object has a disposition such as solubility cannot depend on whether other similar 
objects exist and are subjected to the relevant test. 
 
3 INTRODUCING STRONGER THAN MATERIAL CONDITIONALS 
 
Carnap and his contemporaries sought to provide an analysis of dispositional concepts 
employing only second order, classical, extensional logic. The suggestion that the 
second order quantification should be limited to natural properties is one proposal 
that would break away from this restriction. A more important proposal in the same 
direction concerns the nature of the appropriate conditional. Ryle (1949: 123) asserts 
that, ‘To say that this lump of sugar is soluble is to say that it would dissolve, if 
submerged anywhere, at any time and in any parcel of water.’ Storer (1951: 134) says 
concerning definitions of dispositional concepts (such as colour predicates):  
The peculiarity of all such definitions is the occurrence of sentences of the type: 
“If so and so were to happen, then such and such would be the case”. In a current 
phrase, all definitions of dispositional predicates involve the use of contrary to 
fact conditionals.  
So both Ryle and Storer recognize the connection between dispositions and 
counterfactuals, but retreat from making much of this connection when giving further 
detail, primarily because of empiricist concerns at the metaphysical implications of 
taking counterfactuals at face value. Counterfactual conditionals (and other 
subjunctive conditionals, which are understood to be included) have a modal 
component, seemingly telling us about non-actual potentialities. Ryle takes it that 
there can be no fact of the matter concerning non-actual potentialities. Consequently 
the sentence ‘this lump of sugar would dissolve if placed in water’ does not assert some 
factual truth, such as the attribution of a property to a thing. Rather, along with law-
statements, such assertions must be understood as inference-tickets: one is entitled to 
infer from ‘this lump of sugar is in water’ to ‘this lump of sugar is dissolving’. in effect 
the modal feature of dispositions is located in the inference-ticket. Ryle does not tell us 
what features of the world entitles us to employ such an inference-ticket.  
Storer points out that the second half of the second disjunct in his analysis (‘B is not 
possessed by any item that is in water and does not dissolve’) is equivalent to: 
everything that is B is such that if it is placed in water then it dissolves. That covers the 
conditional component of the counterfactual conditional, but not the modal. The 
modal feature is in effect what Storer is trying to capture by the idea of there being a 
causal basis that is shared between an item not undergoing the test and other items 
that are being tested. Implicitly, Storer is suggesting that the causal basis is a property 
that would bring about the response in the object, were it to be tested—but without 
resorting to modal language.  
In the light of the forgoing it is not surprising that philosophers should eventually 
conclude that dispositions could not be analyzed using the material conditional. 
Rather, a stronger than material conditional needs to be employed, which we may 
symbolise by ‘⇒’ (without saying too much about its nature). We can also use ‘Sx’ to 
denote the test/stimulus condition, ‘Mx’ to denote the response/manifestation 
condition, and ‘D(S,M)’ to denote the disposition to yield manifestation M in response 
to stimulus S.  
Sellars (1958) asserts that ascription of a disposition is simply to assert a relation of 
implication between the stimulus and manifestation. Hence:  
(W) D(S,M)x   iff   Sx ⇒ Mx.  
The philosophical task, according to Sellars, is to explain what ‘⇒’ means. Sellars 
himself draws on the idea of ‘causal implication’ (which we find also in Pap 1958), and 
expresses the idea found in Storer and also in Burks (1955), that we may need to 
appeal to the idea that when there is dispositional relationship between Sx and Mx 
there is a kind or property to which x belongs and which plays some kind of causal or 
nomological role in bringing about Mx. These authors were concerned whether their 
notions of causal implication are compatible with a Humean regularity view of 
causation and law (Malzkorn 2001: 343).  
 
4 THE CONDITIONAL ANALYSIS OF DISPOSITIONS 
 
The position in the 1950s was that philosophers recognized that dispositional and 
counterfactual assertions are related and that both of these have connections with 
statements concerning laws and causes. Goodman (1954) distinguished the analysis of 
counterfactuals from analyzing the meaning of law statements. On the other hand, by 
his own admission, Goodman was unable to articulate the details of their relationship. 
Furthermore, he remained committed to a Humean view of laws that distinguishes 
them from other regularities only in virtue of our propensity to use them in inferences 
and predictions (cf. the Rylean inference-ticket view of dispositions and laws 
mentioned above).  
The discussion of the analysis of dispositions was given a major impetus by the 
development of a semantics for counterfactuals by Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973), 
following earlier work by Kripke on semantics for modal logic. The semantics 
provided for counterfactuals made them philosophically respectable, while also 
articulating their problematic relationship with laws. Lewis also provided an account 
of causation in terms of counterfactuals, allowing a further dissociation of 
counterfactuals, laws, and causes. Thus it was possible to see that the causal 
conditional of Burks, Pap, and Sellars is a conflation of two related but separate 
notions, the counterfactual conditional and causation.  
Furthermore, Lewis’s account is based on an objective Humean view of laws rather 
than one depending on inference tickets or habits, thus providing a firm metaphysical 
basis for understanding dispositions from a Humean/empiricist perspective. At the 
same time, concern about the empiricist credentials of any analysis was waning as a 
result of a more general retreat of empiricism in the philosophy of science, and the 
resurgence of interest in metaphysics, especially modal metaphysics, thanks to the 
work of Kripke and others.  
In the light of the above, we can replace the ‘⇒’ in (W) with a pure counterfactual 
conditional: ‘→ ’. Thus (W) becomes what would become known as the (simple) 
conditional analysis of dispositions, the basis of much of the recent discussion of 
dispositional expressions:  
(CA) D(S,M)x   iff   Sx → Mx.  
By the 1960s, it was widely accepted that dispositional statements either mean the 
same as or at least entail counterfactual or subjunctive conditionals. Armstrong (1969: 
23) tells us, as if it were not much more than a platitude, that, ‘If we consider the 
attribution of (say) brittleness to a particular piece of glass then one outstanding 
feature of the attribution is that it licenses certain conditionals. If the glass remains 
unbroken, then conditionals will be ‘counterfactual’. If the glass had been struck, it 
would have broken.’ However, until Stalnaker and Lewis, counterfactuals were 
themselves sufficiently mysterious and even suspect that authors felt obliged not to rest 
content with analyzing dispositions in terms of counterfactuals but were required to 
bypass the counterfactuals and to give an account in yet further terms that reflect 
wider philosophical (typically metaphysical) concerns. After Lewis, it was possible to 
distinguish acceptance of the (subjunctive/counterfactual) conditional account of the 
meaning of disposition statements from discussion of the metaphysics of dispositions. 
Thus (CA) was generally accepted, while debates focused on metaphysical issues that 
will be mentioned below. 
 
5 OBJECTIONS TO THE CONDITIONAL ANALYSIS AND FURTHER 
DEVELOPMENTS 
 
The conditional analysis, however, suffers from now well-known flaws. Martin’s (1994) 
counterexample of a finkish disposition exploits the fact that in a normal case of 
stimulating a disposition in order to bring about its manifestation, that process takes 
time. The object may be stimulated at time t but the manifestation occurs only at t+δ. 
Dispositions come and go. Very hot glass is not fragile. So a fragile glass might lose its 
fragility by being heated. Let us imagine that were the stimulus to occur at t that 
would cause the disposition to disappear very quickly, certainly well before t+δ. As a 
consequence, the process that would normally lead to the manifestation is interrupted, 
and the manifestation does not occur. So, for example, striking a fragile glass causes it 
to be heated very rapidly, sufficiently rapidly that the process of breaking is halted, 
and the glass does not break.  In such a case the glass is fragile at t, but, since it is 
struck at t but does not subsequently break, it is false at t that were the glass struck it 
would break. (See Lewis (1997) for an attempt to reform (CA) to handle finks.)  
Other objections focus on the fact that even if the disposition remains in place, its 
presence plus the stimulus may not be causally sufficient to bring about the 
manifestation. For environmental conditions may need to be appropriate, and the 
causal process may need to take place in a particular way. If such conditions are 
interfered with, the manifestation may not occur. Such interferers are masks ( Johnston 
1992) or antidotes (Bird 1998).  
The 1990s and 2000s saw increased interest in the analysis of dispositions coming 
from a number of quarters. In the philosophy of language, Kripke (1982) considered 
and rejected dispositional accounts of rule-following, meaning, and understanding. 
But Martin and Heil (1998) argued that such a rejection depends on accepting (CA). 
The falsity of (CA) means that a counterfactual account of X and a dispositional 
account of X will differ in certain cases. Consequently problems with a counterfactual 
account of, for example, intentional or free action (Frankfurt 1969) may be overcome 
by preferring an account in terms of dispositions or related states, such as capacities 
(Smith 1997). In both cases, the objections can be seen to be trading on finks or 
masks/antidotes.  
As it stands, (CA) provides an analysis only of overtly dispositional locutions, such 
as ‘is disposed to dissolve when placed in water’. Nonetheless, most of the discussion of 
the analysis of dispositional expressions concerns covertly dispositional locutions such 
as ‘soluble’, proceeding on the assumption that the equivalence between the covert 
and overt expressions is straightforward and obvious. For example, we found that 
(CA) seems to be refuted because something may be fragile yet it is false that it would 
break if stressed. But such a counterexample works only on the assumption just 
discussed, that the covertly dispositional ‘x is fragile’ is equivalent to the overtly 
dispositional ‘x is disposed to break when stressed’. However, if that assumption is 
mistaken then the existence of finks and antidotes cannot be taken immediately to 
refute (CA). It might instead refute the simplistic equation of covertly and overtly 
dispositional expressions (cf. Lewis 1997: 153; Choi 2003: 576–7). Indeed Choi (2008) 
undertakes a defence of (CA) on precisely this basis. 
A problem arises when we combine (CA) with the standard Stalnaker–Lewis 
semantics for counterfactuals. That semantics include the centering condition: A∧B 
entails A→B. Thus any two facts are related by the subjunctive conditional ‘→’. 
(CA) says that any two possible or actual states that are subjunctively related are 
dispositionally related. Combining these tells us that any two facts are dispositionally 
related. Since that is clearly false, either (CA) needs amendment or the Stalnaker–
Lewis semantics does. Since there are independent reasons for wanting to adjust the 
latter, it might be worth considering whether further adjustments to the semantics for 
‘→’. For example, we may give up not only centering but also weak centering: 
A→B entails A→B. If we do this, then it is no longer clear that finks and antidotes 
suffice to refute (CA). For then a case where the stimulus S occurs but the 
manifestation M does not occur is consistent with S→M. That might be justified if 
what replaces weak centering is the condition that only in normal worlds where S→M 
is true, is S→M also true (e.g. worlds without finks or masks/antidotes; cf. Gundersen 
2002, 2004).  
While such moves permit us to strengthen the tie between dispositions and 
subjunctive/counterfactual conditions, other developments propose movement in the 
opposite direction, for example the proposal that dispositions should be aligned with 
habitual or generic propositions.  
 
6 METAPHYSICAL CONSIDERATIONS AGAIN 
 
Carnap’s original analysis was motivated by the (anti-)metaphysical considerations 
that underlie his verificationism. The latter is a doctrine concerning the meanings of 
expressions, and so the ‘analysis of dispositions’ is conceived of as providing a 
reductive account of linguistic expressions or concepts. A central concern was to avoid 
an analysis in terms that were equally troubling to a verificationist, such as 
unobservable properties or stronger-than-material conditionals.  
The view that without suitable analysis dispositions were to be deemed not entirely 
respectable remained even after the verificationist impetus to Carnap’s project had 
waned, and counterfactual/subjunctive conditionals themselves were accepted. (CA) 
tells us that to predicate a disposition of an object is equivalent to asserting a 
subjunctive conditional of it. But that tells us little about how the world and in 
particular the object in question must be for the dispositional or subjunctive 
predications—D(S,M)a and Sa → Ma—to be true. Ryle’s inference-ticket 
phenomenalism rejects the idea that there is any particular way the actual worlds is. 
But as metaphysics itself returned to respectability, the question became more 
pressing: what would make either side of (CA) true? A common answer is that the 
subjunctive/counterfactual conditional is made true by the existence of some categorical 
property plus the laws of nature. Thus:  
‘D(S,M)a’ is made true by, for some categorical property F, Fa and its being a law 
of nature that ∀x(Fx∧Sx → Mx)  
A categorical property is held to be one that has no troubling dispositional or 
conditional character, but is necessarily always fully manifest—shape and duration are 
often held to be examples, albeit disputed ones. As Mellor (1974: 157) puts it (not his 
own view): ‘Dispositions are as shameful in many eyes as pregnant spinsters used to 
be—ideally to be explained away, or entitled by a shotgun wedding to take the name 
of some decently real categorical property.’  
In the light of the above, the following remarks are sometimes made:  
(I) The dispositional–categorical distinction is primarily a conceptual or linguistic 
distinction, not a metaphysical one. The dispositional–categorical distinction is 
not a distinction between categories of properties, but between classes of 
expression, between those that permit a conditional analysis and those that do 
not (Strawson 2008; cf. Mumford 1998: 65).  
(II) Dispositional expressions (‘D(S,M)’ in the above) are ones that characterize 
properties (such as F in the above) via their typical effects in the actual world 
with its actual laws of nature (Armstrong 1969, 1997, Quine 1973; Mackie 1973). 
Or they refer to higher-order functional properties (e.g. the property of 
possessing some categorical property such as F in the above) (Prior et al. 1982; 
Prior 1985). In the context of the philosophy of mind, where mental states may 
be seen as dispositions, the former yields an identity theory, whereas the latter 
yields the functionalist view. 
(III) Correspondingly, the failure of (CA) thanks to finks and masks/antidotes is 
sometimes held (a) to undermine the distinction between dispositional and 
categorical expressions, and (b) to vindicate the metaphysical programme of 
rehabilitating dispositional properties real properties as distinct from being either 
just as the shadows of conditionals or identical to categorical properties or higher 
order functional properties realized by categorical properties (Wright 1990, 
Martin 1994: 7; Mumford 1998: 63; Schrenk 2010: 171; cf. Mellor 1974).  
Such debates reflect some unclarity about the nature of attempts to analyze 
dispositions and the relationship between the semantics and metaphysics of 
dispositions. As the idea that philosophical analysis is a matter of investigating our 
concepts comes under question (Williamson 2007), it might appear that the alternative 
in this case will hold that the philosophical activity of analyzing dispositions concerns 
those properties, the dispositions, rather than our concept of disposition. But to take 
such a view requires that there is indeed a distinct class of things the dispositional 
properties. That is what (I) above denies. (I) itself is plausible to the extent that it is 
plausible that (CA) or something like it is true. Conversely, if it is true that we cannot 
find a straightforward analysis of dispositions, it become more plausible that our 
dispositional expressions do pick out a distinct class of properties, properties that are 
dispositional in nature. The position has a rough analogue in the analysis of 
knowledge. If the simple justified true belief account of knowledge were correct, then 
that would indicate that ‘knowledge’ is a term that serves simply to pick our a subclass 
of beliefs, those that meet certain additional conditions. In which case it is plausible 
that the analysis of knowledge is just a matter of analysis a concept. On the other 
hand, as Williamson (1995) argues, the failure of attempt to analyze knowledge into 
belief plus other conditions is evidence that states of knowing are not a subclass of the 
states of belief, but constitute a distinct kind of mental state. In which case the analysis 
of knowledge (conceived more broadly than simply supplying necessary and sufficient 
conditions) is an investigation into the nature of knowledge itself.  
On the other hand there is uncertainty as to whether the dispositional and 
disposition-like expressions themselves form a unified class. The distinction between 
covert and overt dispositional expressions has already been mentioned; it is not agreed 
that we can assimilate these to a single class. Moreover, terms for abilities, capacities, 
tendencies, and propensities have similarities to disposition terms, but no clear 
unification of all these is yet available. Putting that variety on one side, there are 
questions about what sort of thing such terms could refer to. The expression 
‘dispositional property’ carries with it a degree of ambiguity. Some terms in basic 
physics refer to properties that are argued to be dispositional in nature or essentially 
dispositional, for example ‘inertial mass’, ‘charge’, ‘velocity’, and so forth (Ellis and 
Lierse 1994; Bird 2007; Lange 2005). Such properties are fundamental natural 
properties and so are good candidates for being sparse universals. On the other hand 
the paradigm disposition expressions discussed in the literature, such as ‘fragility’, 
denote properties that are neither fundamental nor obviously natural (note the 
diversity of things that can be fragile and the manner of their being fragile, such as 
both an old parchment and the economy). If it is appropriate to think of these are 
referring to entities at all, the referents will be abundant universals. If ‘T’ refers to a 
sparse universal, it is plausible to think that the analyzing T is analyzing the thing, the 
universal T, and that this is a different exercise from analyzing the concept T (or the 
term ‘T’). On the other hand, if ‘T’ denotes an abundant universal, then it is rather 
less clear that there is distinction between analyzing T and analyzing the concept T. 
For the existence of abundant universals seems to be little more than an ontological 
shadow of the possibility of predication by the concept T—if, that is, there are 
abundant universals at all. So if properties that are paradigmatic dispositions such as 
fragility, solubility, malleability, etc. are not natural properties, then it is difficult to see 
how there can be a project of analyzing dispositions that is different from analayzing 




The earliest phase of the history of analyses of dispositions conceives itself as engaged 
in the task of analyzing dispositional expressions or concepts, providing substitutions 
equivalent in meaning.  It was motivated by radically empiricist (anti)-metaphysics 
and epistemology which give rise to the verificationist criterion of meaningfulness. 
Carnap’s own failed attempts show that it is impossible to provide a complete analysis 
of dispositional expressions that complies with that criterion. The same empiricism 
limits Carnap to use of truth-functional connectives, so his ‘conditional’ analysis of 
dispositions invokes only the material conditional, which is too weak for the purposes 
required of it (e.g. characterising what is true of a soluble item that is not in water and 
distinguishing it from a non-soluble item not in water). Some authors noted that a 
soluble item not in water will often be similar to a soluble item that is placed in water 
(and so is dissolving). This approach is of interest because for the first time it 
introduces the idea of what we would now call the causal basis of the disposition, and 
because it raises questions concerning the naturalness of properties. Metaphysical 
questions of a kind inimical to radical empiricism are beginning to come to the fore. 
The true break with Carnap’s intended programme comes when it is understood that 
the material conditional needs to replaced by something stronger and so non-truth-
functional. This eventually settles on the counterfactual/subjunctive conditional, 
giving the standard (simple) conditional analysis of dispositions. It settles on this slowly 
partly because of residual empiricist scepticism about such conditionals but also 
because such conditionals were poorly understood—a state of affairs remedied by the 
possible-world semantics of Stalnaker and Lewis in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  
The conditional analysis, backed up by a semantics for the conditional, is only the 
beginning of the contemporary story of the analysis of dispositions. This debate is 
pursued not, as it was by Carnap, to avoid substantive metaphysics but in order to aid 
it, first in order better to understand the commitments of a dispositional–functional 
account of mind and then thanks to dispositional essentialist accounts of natural 
properties and laws. Nonetheless, the business of analyzing dispositions is still seen 
primarily as one concerning the nature of disposition expressions and concepts. But as 
such an approach is questioned by the recent debate regarding the nature of 
philosophical analysis itself: is analysis concerned with concepts or with the things 
themselves? The intertwining of the metaphysics and semantics of dispositions suggests 
that the plausibility of competing answers to that question may itself depend on the 
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